The Climate change, in fact, is 'fundamentally an ethical issue ' (Gardiner 2004, p. 556), one that challenges our established morality and moral intuitions, hinders the response from political systems, and ultimately threatens our lives (Jamieson 2008 , Miller 2008 , Gardiner 2004 . Its moral essence depends on actions of people that harm -and will harm -other people living now and in the future. 3 In particular, carbon emissions (i.e., the harmful actions) by a diffuse group of people around the globe which, by consuming a common resource such as the atmospheric absorptive capacity, threaten the stability of the climate system, and the consequent harm caused by the altered climatic dynamics to a diffuse group of present and future people even in remote parts of the globe, are its moral facets.
3 argue, the two faces of the same moral coin, because they both centre on a single, core moral issue, namely preventing some people from harming other people. Therefore, it is ultimately prevention from causing, and prevention/reaction from suffering, harm that in the context of climate change confronts with moral dilemmas, that is, with moral questions for which there are multiple answers inspired by different moral principles and/or theories, and that, given the harmful nature of the climate problem, necessitate some moral -and not conventional -rules (Nado et al. 2009 , Turiel 1983 ).
Yet, our scant familiarity with, and knowledge of, the nature (Chen 2011 ) and moral traits (Jamieson 2008 , Sinnot-Armstrong 2005 of climate change determined, mainly, by mental models and ontological assumptions (Chen 2011) , cognitive biases and use of heuristics (Baron 2006) , misunderstanding of risk and harm (Sunstein 2006) , lack of direct experience (Leiserowitz 2006 ) and loss aversion (Rachlinski 2000) , by and large induces intuitive emotional moral responses that preclude a proper understanding of climate ethics and ultimately impede effective policy responses.
In light of these considerations, in what follows I will try to point out an appropriate moral approach to the harm-related moral dilemmas raised by climate change according to the contributions of recent developments in moral psychology, broadly understood. My thesis, in fact, is that the ethics of climate change, to increase its acceptability and favour policy-making, should be more in line with the indications on moral processes and judgments, that is, closer to the inner nature of the morality of human beings. My attempt is based on insights from moral cognitive neuroscience, which assumes that divergent moral theories/principles originate from human psychology, that cognitive neuroscientific methods are particularly useful for clarifying the consequent persistence of fault lines (i.e., moral dilemmas) between them, and that this understanding is morally significant and, in regard to the aim of this article, important for advancing a suitable moral approach to the ethics of climate change and for increasing its political feasibility. , Jamieson 2005 , Singer 2002 . Some of the ethical facets of the adaptation duty, still relatively unexplored, have been directly addressed through investigation of moral principles for allocating its cost (e.g., Dellink et al. 2009 , Baer et al. 2008 , Jagers and Duss-Otteström 2008 , indirectly, through the individuation of responsibility for climate burdens (e.g., Page 2008 , Paavola et al. 2006 , Caney 2005 , or through integrated approaches of distributive and procedural justice (Grasso 2010a, b) . It should be borne in mind that the article focuses only on the distributive aspects of justice: when considering the overall picture, it is also necessary to consider the procedural notion of justice (Gardiner 2010a , Grasso 2010a related to decisional processes and procedures.
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In particular, I will make clear the contributions of moral cognitive neuroscience for framing, coherently with the specificities of the context of analysis, harm-related moral reasoning, and I will figure out the consequentialist approach that such a perspective suggests in regard to climate ethics. In the concluding Section, I will briefly sketch the main traits of such a consequentialist approach against climate change and consider its main difficulties.
I. INSIGHTS FROM MORAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Moral cognitive neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field based on the integration of psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology and anthropology that 'aims to elucidate the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie moral behaviour' (Moll et al. 2005, p. 799) . Its objective is explanation of the processes of moral judgment in physical terms (Greene 2009 ) through study of the interaction among three levels of analysis associated with moral cognition: the psychological level, which investigates the nature of relevant psychological states, their developmental origins and their cultural and evolutionary history; the cognitive level, which focuses on the pertinent information-processing mechanisms; and the neural level, which concerns the brain mechanisms and regions involved. In other words, moral cognitive neuroscience scrutinizes issues of interest to moral philosophy (e.g., moral dilemmas, that is, nonnegotiable answers for questions non-independently adjudicable (Cushman and Greene 2011) ) on the basis of the moral psychology approach (e.g., behavioural experiments, whereby participants are asked to carry out tasks involving moral decision-making), and using the methods traditionally employed by cognitive neuroscience (e.g., brain imaging methods).
Traditionally, psychology understood moral judgment mainly as a reasoning process characterized by higher cognition (Kohlberg 1969) ; more recently emotions have assumed a central role in moral decision-making (Haidt 2001 , Rozin et al. 1999 . In the past few years a wealth of studies have quite unambiguously made clear that moral judgements are produced by the interaction among multiple cognitive systems (Cushman and Young 2009 , Greene 2008 , Sinnott-Armstrong 2008 . 6 In particular, a 6 The coexistence of emotion and cognition in decision making is indeed not new: psychologists have long acknowledged the distinction between efficient, specialized, automatic processes and less efficient, slower mechanisms, involved in controlled processes (Cohen et al. 1990, Kahneman and Treisman 1984) . Social cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics have similarly distinguished between a X-system (or system 1), and a C-system (or system 2). The former is a parallel processing, subsymbolic pattern that produces a continuous, automatic stream of consciousness that quickly proposes answers to problems (Satpute and growing body of evidence supported by neuroimaging methods , 2001 , Koenigs 2007 , Blair et al. 2006 , Cushman et al. 2006 , Schaich Borg et al. 2006 , Casebeer 2003 demonstrates that moral judgment is accomplished both by intuitive and rational psychological processes, and is produced by affective/emotional and cognitive/controlled cognitive systems.
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Among these studies, a promising foundation for my analysis is offered by Greene and colleagues (Cushman et al. 2010 , 2001 , Greene 2008 who, on investigating the neural bases of moral judgement, have developed a dual process theory of morality which confirms that both affective/emotional responses and cognitive/controlled ones play fundamental, and sometimes mutually competitive, roles.
Their work reverberates and composes the juxtaposition between Kant's rationalism and Hume's sentimentalism in moral philosophy. It also synthesizes, on the one hand, the long-standing cognitive paradigm of moral psychology developed by Kholberg (1969), which assumes, in line with the Kantian view, that moral judgement is generated by conscious, rational reasoning on moral principles/theories applied to particular cases, with, on the other, the more recent intuitionist approach developed by Haidt (2001) , which, by revaluating the Humean sentimentalist tradition, holds, quite radically, that moral judgement is grounded in intuitions generated by unconscious, automatic cognitive processes for which conscious reasoning provides a post hoc moral justification.
Greene and colleagues focus on moral dilemmas related to 'physically harmful behavior' 8 (Cushman et al. 2010, p. 2), and they advance consequent normative implications on consequentialist and deontological moral reasoning. Consequentialism is an ethical approach that holds that acts and/or intentions are morally relevant, i.e.
right, wrong or indifferent, only in virtue of their consequences, that is, of the state of Lieberman 2006 , Camerer et al. 2005 , Kahneman 2003 ). The C-system is a controlled process that uses symbolic logic to produce the conscious thoughts that monitor, and if necessary correct and override, the stream of consciousness generated by the X-system (Lieberman 2007 , Cohen 2005 . 7 The term cognitive of cognitive/controlled is used in a narrow sense as the opposite of affective/emotional. In this understanding cognitive processes are slow, effortful and voluntary, and are juxtaposed to affective/emotional processes that are rapid, effortless and involuntary (Cushman et al. 2010) . The general notion of cognitive instead refers to information processing. 8 To be noted that Greene and colleagues regard the personal/impersonal distinction as a first-cut for distinguishing the cognitive bases of moral issues (Greene in press), and further refinements were offered by subsequent studies (e.g., Greene et al. 2008 In conveying the usefulness of the work of Greene and colleagues in dealing with the prevention from causing, and prevention/reaction from suffering, harm moral dilemmas entailed by climate change, it is necessary to set out their main arguments. They first explore the role of affective/emotional and cognitive/controlled cognitive systems in harm-related moral dilemmas that characterize the classic trolley problem (Thomson 1985 , Foot 1967 , the fruit fly of moral judgement. Here, although in both the scenarios depicted one person dies to save five other persons, people mostly seem to condemn the footbridge case, while they favour trading one life for five in the switch scenario, independently of biological and cultural differences (Greene et al. 2004 (Greene et al. , 2001 ): an inconsistency that philosophers are unable to satisfactorily explain (Greene 2008 , Singer 2005 . Greene et al. (2004 Greene et al. ( , 2001 hypothesized, on descriptive bases, that the divergent answers to the trolley problem depend on the emotional contents of the harming action: that of the switch case is less significant because the harm, similarly to what happens in the context of climate change, is brought about in an impersonal way (i.e., by hitting a switch), whereas in the footbridge case the harm (i.e., pushing a man off a bridge) is up close and personal and triggers alarm bell-like emotions that override more controlled responses. Such alarm bell emotions, they further argue, are grounded in our genes, as evolutionary psychology suggests, since the emotional aversion to harming other humans evolved as a strategy that allowed people to build stable social structures that gave them an advantage over other species (Greene 2008 , Cohen 2005 , Singer 2005 ). The impersonal switch scenario, by contrast, fails to prompt such alarm bell emotions and therefore admits cognitive/controlled moral reasoning.
In order to test their hypotheses empirically, Greene and colleagues (Greene et al. 2001 ) scanned the brain activation produced by behavioural experiments on the trolley problem using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). They found, as predicted, that impersonal cases, like the switch scenario, generate greater activity in brain areas associated with effortful, cognitive/controlled reasoning (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe), while personal cases, like the footbridge scenario, yield greater activation of affective/emotional brain areas (the posterior 7 cingulated cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdale). They also showed that subjects who consider the personal harm scenario morally acceptable have to override strong emotions, as made evident by the longer time needed to reach this moral judgment. Their subsequent study (Greene et al. 2004 ) proved that in difficult moral dilemmas that impose a choice between saving one life and many lives, as in the crying baby case, consequentialist reasoning needs additional cognitive control. This is detectable from the activation of the anterior cingulated cortex that signals this need to the classical cognitive areas of the brain, especially in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in their experiments. Finally, Greene and colleagues ) observed that cognitive load selectively interferes with consequentialist moral reasoning, thus supporting the claim that this is preferentially carried out by controlled cognitive processes.
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The dual-process theory ultimately reveals two different processes of moral judgment:
a (predominantly) cognitive one that supports the maximization of the overall good, and a (predominantly) emotional one that upholds the no-harm rule. Which of the two processes is more intensely activated determines the final moral judgment (Cushman and Young 2009) . A sensible interpretation of these findings, evinced by observation of brain activity, is that the first process involves consequentialist reasoning and the second deontological reasoning (Greene 2008 (Tetlock et al. 2000) . These protected (Baron and Spranca 1997) or sacred (Fiske and Tetlock 1997) values are deemed to be strictly related to deontological duties, which forbid certain actions regardless of their consequences (Tanner et al. 2008, Baron and Spranca 1997) . In an environmentally-sensitive context such as climate change, therefore, the threat to ecosystems would trigger deontological reasoning that could outweigh human-centred, harm-related consequentialist reasoning: the emotional activation produced by the transgression of a protected value would in fact prevent people from a consequentialist inclination to accept profitable trade-offs and ultimately inhibit welfare-improving choices. For the reasons illustrated in the next Section, however, I argue that this issue does not rule out the consequentialist approach to the climate crisis envisaged by moral cognitive neuroscience.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
What are the implications for climate ethics of the insights from moral cognitive neuroscience? To answer this question it is useful to explore in some more depth the 13 It is worth noting the difference between philosophical intuitions, that is what philosophers consider natural judgement, and psychological intuitions, that is, outputs of cognitive processes to which individuals have no conscious access. In what follows, consistently with moral cognitive neuroscience, I will always refer to psychological intuitions.
14 Intriguingly, Levy (2011) claims that Greene's and colleagues work provides a set of evidence for judging the reliability of moral intuitions.
moral essence of climate change. As stated in the Introduction, the main moral dilemmas that characterize it are related to causing/suffering harm. Such harm, however, does not have the characteristics of the archetypal moral problem: i) the intentionality of the harming subjects; ii) the possibility to identify the harming and harmed subjects, and the harm; iii) the time and space proximity of the harming and harmed subjects, and of the harm. In fact, in the context of climate change there is no clearly identifiable subject (agent) that acts intentionally in order to produce harm to another clearly identifiable subject (victim) close by in time and space. Rather, there are numerous agents that, through their ordinary actions (driving a car, working at a computer, eating meat), inadvertently and/or inevitably and/or ignorantly set in motion forces that will harm numerous victims distant in time and space. Since it is not possible to identify agents and victims, the casual link between them, and the relevant moral dimensions, the harm principle, which posits that there is a moral obligation not to perform actions that cause harm to others, does not hold. In light of this archetypal structure of harm-related moral dilemmas it seems therefore natural to argue that '….
we tend not to see climate change as a moral problem, it does not motivate us to act with the urgency characteristic of our responses to moral challenges' (Jamieson 2008, p. 546 Furthermore, it does not help that, despite the unsuccessful history of morality in the climate context, the relevant literature, still quite rigidly articulated into the duties of mitigation and adaptation, seems to persist in wrongly framing the moral challenges of climate change. In fact, it fails fully to grasp the harm-related moral essence of the climate crisis, let alone the nature of the harm, and continues largely to ground both the duties of mitigation and adaptation in deontological moral reasoning. This is evident in the paradigmatic definition of the ethics of climate change offered by a prominent scholar, who maintains that it ultimately boils down to 'rich people appropriating more than their share of a global public good and, in addition, harming poor people by casually contributing to extreme climatic events' (Jamieson 2010b, p. 435 ). Jamieson's duty of mitigation -rich people appropriating more than their share -basically refers to a resource-sharing moral dilemma and suggests that some people do/did the wrong action of abusing the atmospheric capacity through GHG emissions. Consequently, the state of affairs that their wrong action brings/has brought about should be rectified in order to respect the moral norm of using their fair share. This is, I argue, exemplary deontological moral reasoning that avoids the harm issue, where moral judgement is conducted on the basis of the moral norm of fairly sharing a common resource and produces the obligation of refraining from abuse of that resource, irrespectively of any consequence that such obligation may produce on subjects of justice. More generally, it seems possible to claim that the duty of mitigation is generally understood as a resource-sharing moral issue grounded in deontological patterns of distribution (i.e., general distributive constructs) such as equality, priority, sufficiency (Page 2006 the principle of historical responsibility, which allocates costs of emission abatement in proportion to past contributions that subjects of justice have made to the overall level of emissions (Meyer and Roser 2010 , Neumayer 2000 , Shue 1999 ). Other popular deontological principles for sharing the burden of mitigation derived from the abovementioned patterns are equal per capita (Jamieson 2005 , Singer 2002 , equal burden (Moellendorf 2009 ), ability to pay and beneficiary pays (Page 2008) , subsistence/luxury emissions (Shue 1993) , access to the ecological space, that is, to the atmosphere's capacity to absorb GHG emissions (Hayward 2007) . A harm-related, but still profoundly deontological, principle is instead offered by Caney (2005, p. 768) , who holds that people 'have the human right not to suffer from the disadvantages generated by global climate change'.
The duty of adaptation -harming poor people by casually contributing to extreme climatic events -conversely refers almost exclusively to the harm generated by climate change. Nevertheless, similarly to the duty of mitigation, this duty is commonly addressed from a deontological perspective. In particular, this perspective refers to the no-harm moral norm largely grounded in the notions of responsibility and vulnerability, which produce obligations related to prevention and adaptation activities against climate impacts, and to compensation for residual damages. Responsibility is generally based on some forms of contribution to the problem (retrospective responsibility) and capacity to pay (prospective responsibility) (Baer et al. 2008 , Page 2008 , Jagers and Duss-Otteström 2008 , Paavola et al. 2006 , Caney 2005 . Vulnerability, considered by the UNFCCC at article 4.4 to be the basis for assisting developing countries in meeting the cost of adaptation to climate impacts, especially in its social understanding, focuses instead on the right of subjects to rely on factors such as assets, sources of livelihood, institutional capacity for limiting climate harms (Kelly and Adger 2000) .
We are, apparently, at a dead-end: climate change is a macroscopic moral issue, but we cannot treat it as such because we generally insist on considering its ethical dimensions from a moral standpoint (deontology) prompted by unreliable moral intuitions inconsistent with the relevant inner nature of human morality. Important for solving this conundrum is the little help from moral cognitive neuroscience of the title.
To put it plainly, the dual-process theory embraced suggests that climate moral dilemmas lack the personalness of the harm inflicted that would activate the (predominantly) emotional response upholding the deontological approaches largely invoked in the climate debate. In other words, human morality does not envision climate change as a deontological moral issue. But this does not mean that the moral 13 brain cannot construe climate change as a moral issue tout court. The dual-process theory suggests, in particular, that causing/suffering harm, the ultimate moral dilemma of climate change, originates from a relatively impersonal moral violation. Therefore climate change is a moral issue, one that should be based on welfare-improving consequentialist moral reasoning, and not on deontological principles like the ones delineated above grounded in the prohibition of abusing a common resource, in possessing or violating rights, in having duties, responsibilities and vulnerabilities.
Ultimately, the contribution of moral cognitive neuroscience to climate ethics resides in its dismissal of unreliable moral deontological intuitions in favour of consequentialist moral thinking. 18 All in all, according to Greene's (forthcoming) camera analogy, climate change is an unfamiliar moral problem that we do not know well. It is unfamiliar because we do not possess the relevant knowledge gained from trial and error experience that would activate automatic responses. I would furthermore argue that we still fail to understand it well largely because of the problems pointed out in the Introduction. Owing to these circumstances, it seems evident that moral judgements in climate change cannot be made through automatic settings; rather, the novelty and complexity of the issues at stake require the flexibility of manual settings. Metaphor aside, the intuitiveness of the deontological response and the consequent temptation to defend it through post-hoc rationalization only works properly with familiar moral problems; but it may be an obstacle for the, extraordinary, most pressing moral problems of our times, such as poverty, overpopulation, and, indeed, climate change, which should instead be approached with consequentialist moral thinking.
To complete the picture, the caveat of the preceding Section needs to be addressed. It warned that the protected-value nature of ecosystems, whose deterioration produces climate harm, could disprove the appropriateness in the climate context of the consequentialist moral reasoning suggested by the dual-process theory. However, I
argue that, as far as the climate crisis is concerned, some theoretical considerations can vindicate the insight offered by moral cognitive neuroscience. The first argument holds that the magnitude and pervasiveness of the climate crisis determine a cognitive context that directs attention to its consequences and to consequentialist considerations, as a recent body of research on the circumstances that undermine the 18 It is worth noting that there are many forms of consequentialism. Suffice it to say here that I am arguing that the dual-process theory seems to endorse a non-maximizing version of consequentialism. This is a less demanding account like those of satisficing consequentialism and progressive consequentialism, whose deontic principle only requires improving the states of affairs.
14 inviolability of protected values (e.g., Bartels, 2008, Bartels and Medin 2007) shows.
Furthermore, Cushman et al. (2010) and Greene (2008) on the basis of their involvement in the climate crisis (e.g., contribution to the problem) and of the a priori moral mandate seem to confirm this hypothesis.
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III. CONCLUSION: IN DEFENCE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM IN CLIMATE CHANGE
Equipped with the insights provided by moral cognitive neuroscience, it may possible to try to 'mercilessly shaking commonsense beliefs' (Moll and de Oliveria-Souza 2007, p. 319) in relation to the ethics of climate change. To this end, as stressed, it is necessary to abandon common, unreliable, moral deontological intuitions, and even to challenge the -deontological -ethical provisions of the UNFCCC, so as to 'do what will produce the best consequences' (Singer 2005, p. 346) . Moral cognitive neuroscience, in fact, challenges common moral intuitions on climate ethics, which, as made clear, are by and large based on some deontological principles about the right/wrong or about rights/duties. It instead tells us that climate ethics should be based on a consequentialist approach aimed at improving overall welfare.
For this purpose, it is indispensable to harvest the low-hanging fruits. Therefore, the first and uncontroversial goal of a consequentialist approach to climate change is to confront the so-called 'no regret budget' (Shue 1994, p. 343) , that is, to undertake both costless actions and those whose costs generate savings, such as a reduction of energy waste and increase of energy efficiency and in the use of renewables: to put it in general terms, to move towards less carbon-dependent lifestyles through novel 19 Preliminary, unpublished experimental results from Sacchi, S., Riva, P., Brambilla, M. and Grasso, M.
(2011), University of Milano-Bicocca.
virtuous behaviours. Unfortunately, science clearly argues that this is insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change The inevitable objection to such a consequentialist approach is that it disregards the, ostensible, truth of facts: some subjects have largely brought about the climate crisis and are suffering from it the least (the North); other subjects have contributed the least and are suffering the most (the South). Shue (1999, p. 535) , for instance, is crystalclear in condemning such approach: '[i]f I said to you, 'I broke it, but I want you to clean it up', then I would be your master and you would be my servant'. It is in fact the poorer subjects of the South that are expected to suffer the majority of the brunt in terms of emission cutbacks, and that are prone to carbon colonization in so far as they are paid to clean up the mess made by the richer Northerners, like, in fact, servants.
Therefore, this vexing counter-intuitiveness is, in my opinion, the main disadvantage of a consequentialist approach to the ethics of climate change: how can such a supposedly cynical proposal be sold in the current climate debate and, even worse, in the frantic context of climate negotiations to pro-Southern activists, to spirited environmentalists, to advocates of egalitarianism and human rights? As a matter of fact, arguments based on welfare have a weaker motivating force than those based on rights and duties (Posner 2008) , and they are unlikely to shake the common moral intuitions that firmly ground the standard (deontological) ethics of climate change.
The pro-consequentialism strategy, I argue, relies on two arguments: the first refers to scientific evidence, and the second to the role of scientists.
20 Ideally, the same approach applies, mutatis mutandis, also at the national level: cheaper emissions should be pursued and the related emitters be compensated by those subjects with higher marginal abatement costs within the national ambit.
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First, it is necessary to point out some pieces of scientific evidence that, by backing the logic of consequentialism, indirectly promote its acceptability. There are, in fact, different scientific findings that support a consequentialist approach to climate change:
I would briefly mention only a couple of them. Schelling (1996 Schelling ( , 1992 , for instance, argued that it is the cost-effectiveness of actions against climate change that should guide climate policy. According to this argument, a consequentialist approach is far more cost-effective than the other scenarios of prevention of climate change currently on offer, whose costs, accordingly to Weyant (2004) , are so high as to be politically unfeasible. Further scientific evidence backing a consequentialist approach is provided by the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), a construct that hypothesizes that the relationship between welfare and the quality of the environment has an inverted U-shape, since the demand for environmental improvements is income-elastic.
In particular, the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (Stern 2007, p. 216-7) shows that this relationship can hold, under a number of specifications, also for carbon emissions. Consequently, the higher the welfare level, the lower, beyond some turning point, the GHG emissions. Given the welfare improvements obtained through compensations for GHG abatements, poorer countries are therefore expected to move faster towards, and to overcome, that turning point, with an eventual decrease in their carbon emissions.
As far as the second argument is concerned, scientists should not only acknowledge and disseminate scientific evidence supporting the superiority of a consequentialist approach against climate change; they should also try to modify the perception of the moral challenge that it poses, according to the indications of moral cognitive neuroscience set out above. I refer mostly to psychologists and other social scientists, who should, in fact, try to alter the moral perception of climate change. The final goal should be to eradicate its perception as a deontological moral issue in favour of welfare-improving consequentialist moral reasoning. To this end, the obvious entry points for modifying the current unreliable moral intuitions that social scientists should better explore and communicate are those resistances, highlighted in the Introduction, that distort the moral understanding and treatment of climate change: established mental models, ontological assumptions, cognitive biases, use of heuristics, misunderstanding of risk and harm, loss aversion.
